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ABSTRACT. Bruce Ackerman's account of the Civil Rights Revolution stresses the
importance of popular sovereignty and the separation of powers as the basis of constitutional
significance. In this view, key spokespersons, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Lyndon
Johnson, served to provide leadership in the effort to eliminate "institutionalized humiliation"
based on racial discrimination. But how well does this account explain the current state of
employment civil rights in the U.S.? This essay explores the rise of "racial realism" in American
employment relations, where employers see race as a real and significant part ofworker identity.
Employers see racial difference as something useful that can affect the effectiveness of their
organizations. This has two variants: racial abilities, referring to perceptions that workers differ
in ability based on their race, and racial signaling, where employers perceive that worker race can
signal different things to customers or members of the public. I explore the use and advocacy of
racial realism in a variety of spheres of private and public employment, including at high- and
low-skilled levels, and argue that racial realism is a significant departure from Ackerman's vision
because-despite its prominence-it lacks national spokespersons, lacks statutory basis and has
very little court authorization, can harm nonwhites, and has never been debated in a public,
deliberative forum.
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INTRODUCTION
The constitutional significance of the Civil Rights Revolution, according to
Bruce Ackerman's new book, lies not in a series of court cases, but in popular
sovereignty and the separation of powers.' He identifies Martin Luther King,
Jr., Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Everett Dirksen as key
spokespersons' for the revolution that had at its heart the elimination of
"institutionalized humiliation" based on racial discrimination.'
My purpose here is to assess current race relations in America, focusing on
employment, in light of Ackerman's argument. My emphasis is not on the
current state of employment discrimination 4 but on what employers or other
advocates say they want to be the case in the management of racial difference in
workplaces. I argue that the current employer focus on managing racial
differences for organizational effectiveness and profit making-a strategy of
management that I call "racial realism"-is a significant departure from
Ackerman's vision of the Civil Rights Revolution in several respects.
First, though racial realism is prominent in business, the professions,
government employment, and media and entertainment, this strategy of
managing racial difference has no national spokespersons comparable to King
and Johnson. Second, though officials of the executive branch and local
governments sometimes practice racial realism when making appointments,
racial realism has surprisingly little legal authorization from the courts and no
statutory basis. Third, racial realism can harm the interests of nonwhites in
ways that sometimes may lead to the kinds of humiliation that Ackerman
claims civil rights laws were designed to prevent. Fourth, while some
employers and other advocates have used or promoted the benefits of racial
realism, this is not the same as the "We the People" popular sovereignty that
Ackerman identifies as the foundation for the civil rights developments of the
1960s. While these employers and other advocates are indeed "The People" in a
direct sense, they are not popularly elected, and the strategy of racial realism in
1. 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 4 (2014).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 13.
4. The research here shows that discrimination and workplace segregation have not steadily
improved and continue to be significant problems. KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD
TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING DESEGREGATION: RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN
PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (2012).
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employment has not been meaningfully debated in any public, deliberative
forum.
In my title, I ask whether we are beyond civil rights. What I mean is that
there is considerable advocacy for practices occurring in a context of- at best -
legal ambiguity. These practices were not a part of the Civil Rights Revolution,
and without proper legal guidance, they can violate the values of that
revolution, and even result in the kind of institutionalized humiliation that
Ackerman argues the revolution was designed to eliminate.
1. ACKERMAN'S WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
It is impossible to summarize Ackerman's magisterial achievement in these
pages. I will instead focus on key parts of his argument that have inspired my
own thoughts here. The most important of these is the notion that popular
sovereignty provides a quasi-constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights
Revolution.
By "Civil Rights Revolution" (capitalized), Ackerman is referring only to
the American establishment of racial equality in the twentieth century,s but this
nevertheless refers to something quite broad. He is interested in the key court
decisions, the key statutes (the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, the Civil Rights Act of 1968), and these statutes' various implementing
regulations.6 He is interested in federal efforts to prohibit private
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and housing, as well
as prohibitions on laws that limit voting rights or choices to marry across racial
lines.'
Ackerman specifies that these efforts to stop discrimination were not
motivated by an anti-classification perspective-by moral beliefs or ideologies
that deem racial classifications to be wrong in any circumstances.8 The goal
was to eliminate what Ackerman refers to as "institutionalized humiliation."
In his view, the landmark statutes of the 196os built on the logic of the Brown
v. Board ofEducation opinion, which struck down segregated schools because of
the "feelings of inferiority" that they created in black children, inhibiting their
5. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id. at 5, 14.
7. Id. at i, 306.
8. Id. at 128.
9. Id.
3005
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ability to learn."o Similarly-but in a significant extension beyond Brown's
limitations on public schooling-exclusions in accommodations, employment,
and private housing created humiliation and feelings of inferiority that the
government had an affirmative duty to prevent." The moral affront of these
systematic exclusions was great enough that the federal government moved to
a New Deal standard operating practice, what Ackerman calls "government by
numbers," or a rationalized commitment to achieving demonstrable results of
the statutory aspirations."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) late 196os
focus on counting the numbers of minorities and women actually being hired
(as opposed to a focus on simply investigating individual complaints of
discrimination)" is therefore not a departure from the Civil Rights Revolution.
It is part of it. To complain about affirmative action as a violation of civil rights
principles would be wrong, in Ackerman's account. It would be like the nation
committing to the principle of highway safety and then complaining about
speed limits.
In Ackerman's view, then, the Civil Rights Revolution was a majoritarian
action, even if it required a determined and violently repressed social
movement to force the momentum toward reform. Unelected federal
administrators and judges played key roles, to be sure, but their actions were
only fulfilling the will of the elected representatives of the people. There were
several individuals who acted as "spokesmen"-Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Everett Dirksen14-who did not lead
public opinion. They reflected it. For example, Congress protected
employment civil rights with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at the
height of public opinion support for equal employment opportunity." This is
what Ackerman means when he emphasizes the popular sovereignty that gave
power to the Civil Rights Revolution. 6 It was the will of We the People -
henceforth capitalized to emphasize this specific meaning of popular
sovereignty.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 14.
13. Id. at 180-83.
14. Id. at 7.
is. PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEw DEAL 55 (1985).
16. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
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II. STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING EMPLOYMENT IN THE 20005
Ackerman's survey of the grand sweep of the Civil Rights Revolution from
the New Deal to the 1970s affords us the opportunity to take stock of what the
protection of civil rights looks like today. My focus here is on the context of
employment, a key part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 since it involves
opportunities to pursue a livelihood. Specifically, I am interested in the
perspectives of employers and their efforts to manage their workplaces, which
were to be constrained by Title VII.
When we take this employer perspective, we can see complexity in twenty-
first century American employment relations. Specifically, there are variations
in approaches to racial differences in employment. First, we can see that Title
VII's guarantees of nondiscrimination and the "government by numbers"
approach of affirmative action appear to be quite distinct, even if they are
related and focused on the same goal. We can also see a separate approach to
managing racial difference in the workplace that would appear to involve some
discrimination, but not always the systematic humiliation that Ackerman
argues Congress intended Title VII to prevent.
In the United States in the 2000S, then, there are three distinct strategies of
managing racial difference in workplaces. We can understand their distinctions
when we consider what meaning or significance they give to race, when we
identify their goals, and also when we consider what basis or authorization
they have in law.
As I have detailed elsewhere," the most prominent strategy for managing
racial difference in the workplace is what we may call classical liberalism. In this
strategy, employers are to ignore race entirely: racial differences have no
meaning or significance for employers for any reason. The goal of classical
liberalism is equal opportunity and justice. (Ackerman would argue that it is
designed to prevent humiliation.)
Classical liberalism has a strong legal basis in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which states simply that employers are to ignore racial and other
employee traits when managing their workplaces. Title VII flatly prohibits
employment discrimination:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
I. JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEw AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (2014).
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to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
The message here appears quite clear: racial differences must not factor into
employment decisions.
Title VII was not the first legal intervention mandating a classically liberal
strategy in employment. As Ackerman notes, efforts from the Reconstruction
era came alive in the Civil Rights Revolution. For example, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, regulating economic relations. It stated that "[aill
persons ... shall have the same right . .. to make and enforce contracts"o as is
enjoyed by white citizens. This statute could reach employment contracts, and
it decreed that opportunities in contracting must in no way be impacted by
racial differences.
Affecting specifically government employment, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause" also became a force for classical
liberalism after the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision in
1954. That decision stated that racial segregation in the public education
context was a violation of the equal protection of the laws, and therefore
unconstitutional." While explicitly limited to education, the unanimous
decision provided a foundation for the civil rights statutes of the 196os,
including Title VII, that banned differential treatment based on race."
A second strategy of managing racial difference in employment can be
called affirmative-action liberalism. In this strategy, employers might consider
racial differences when making employment decisions, and therefore, racial
differences have some meaning and significance, but only in a very limited
way. Racial differences have significance only insofar as consideration of race
18. 42 U.S.C. 5 20ooe-2(a) (20o6).
ig. I ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 211-15.
20. 42 U.S.C. 5 1981.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, 5 i.
22. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 3 4 7 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. 3 ACKERMAN, supra note i, at 128-29.
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can help achieve the goals of affirmative-action liberalism, which happen to be
the same as the goals of classical liberalism: equal opportunity and justice.M
Ackerman folds affirmative-action liberalism into classical liberalism since
"government by numbers" (affirmative-action liberalism) shares with Title VII
the goals of equal opportunity and justice, or the elimination of the systematic
humiliation created by widespread employment discrimination. But from the
perspective of the employer, and how she or he must view workers, they are
quite different. Affirmative-action liberalism requires employers to manage
their workforces by categorizing and counting on the basis of government
racial categories, and ensuring minorities' equal participation and opportunity
in the workplace. Thus, the intent is the same, but the means are different.
Title VII does not require that employers use affirmative action of any type,
but it does allow it. Affirmative-action liberalism has legal authorization in
regulations and guidelines created by the EEOC, Title VII's implementing
agency." Moreover, in 1965, Executive Order 11,24 6 required affirmative action
by government contractors. Various statutes and regulations have used
affirmative-action liberalism in spheres outside of employment, such as racial
"set asides" in government procurement,2 7 the Small Business Administration's
special help for minority-owned small firms, 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which has elements that reaffirm the affirmative-action-liberal parts of the
disparate-impact-discrimination doctrine that the Supreme Court had
weakened in its Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio decision.
24. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 6.
25. 29 C.F.R. 5 16o8 (1979); U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL S 15-IV(C) (20o6) [hereinafter
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf.
26. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 41 C.F.R. 5 60 (1965).
27. John D. Skrentny, Republican Efforts to End Affinnative Action: Walking a Fine Line, in
SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT THE NEW CENTURY 132, 152 (Martin
A. Levin et al. eds., 2001).
28. George R. La Nouc & John C. Sullivan, Deconstructing Affirmative Action Categories, in
COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR
AMERICA 214 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
President George H.W. Bush vetoed an earlier version of the Act in 1990, calling it a "quota
bill." See Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/199o/10/23/us/president-vetoes-bill-on-job-rights
-showdown-is-set.html.
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The Supreme Court has also explicitly stated the rules for employers,
private and public, choosing to manage their workforces using affirmative-
action liberalism. In United Steelworkers v. Weber"o and Johnson v. Transportation
Agency,31 the Supreme Court upheld employers' voluntary plans for the
consideration of race as long as they followed at least three rules: (1) the plan
had to have the goal of remedying an imbalance in the employer's workforce;
(2) the plan could not unnecessarily limit opportunities for whites or males;
and (3) the plan had to be temporary, and could not be used as a long-term
strategy for maintaining any preferred percentages of racial groups in the
workforce.3
Similarly, the EEOC defines "affirmative action" as "those actions
appropriate to overcome the effects of past or present practices, policies, or
other barriers to equal employment opportunity."3 Courts can also order
affirmative action in cases where employers were found to have discriminated
in the past, and affirmative action plans can be included in consent decrees. 34
A third strategy of managing racial difference is what I call racial realism.
With this strategy, employers perceive race as something real and relevant to
the functioning of their workplaces, and believe the effective management of
racial difference can improve organizational operations and (for private
employers) potentially increase profits." My use of the term "realism" here is
meant to emphasize employer perception of the ontological reality of race,
rather than the jurisprudential tradition of legal realism.36
30. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
31. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
32. See id. at 630-31.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1979).
34. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1986).
35. Legal scholar Nancy Leong has developed a similar concept focusing on the instrumental
use of racial differences. She calls this "racial capitalism," though her concept is broader than
what I discuss here, and includes any or most situations where the race of nonwhites has
exchange value for whites. For example, she includes a firm using race to symbolize
compliance with civil rights law as an example of racial capitalism. By contrast, I consider
only uses of race designed to improve the effectiveness of organizations, where race becomes
a qualification for a job, as examples of racial realism, because these uses give race meaning
but are not geared toward satisfying the justice goals of civil rights and affirmative action
law. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARv. L. REV. 2151, 2153 (2013).
36. My use of racial realism therefore has little in common with that of Derrick Bell, who used
the same phrase to refer to a philosophy or mentality that saw racial equality as an
unattainable goal in the United States. Bell argued for acknowledgement of the subordinate
status for people of color and skepticism toward civil rights laws and policies. Derrick Bell,
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Employers managing their workforces using racial realism share with those
using affirmative-action liberalism a focus on racial difference, and also similar
to affirmative-action liberalism, racial realism will not, or will only very rarely,
explicitly and openly benefit whites and males." The key difference is the
motive for the significance of race in the employment process. Instead of a
focus on the lives of minority workers, race has significance for racial realists
because it is consequential for the organization's future functioning."' The goal
of racial realists is not equal opportunity or justice, but organizational
effectiveness. 9
Employers use racial realism in at least two main variants. One of these we
can call racial abilities. This refers to employer perceptions that workers of
different races will vary in their aptitudes, but racial abilities can be found in
different modes. 4 0 In some cases, employers believe that racial diversity leads to
more innovative ideas and more dynamic work environments. 4' Here,
employers do not link racial differences to any specific job, but race is
nevertheless linked to ability-the ability to think differently than those of
other races-and racial difference becomes a qualification for a job based on
predictions of future performance in ways that cannot occur with affirmative-
action liberalism. In other cases, employers believe that members of minority
groups have special abilities to understand or deliver services to members of
their respective groups that nonmembers are so likely to lack that race becomes
a qualification for certain jobs. Perceptions that Latinos are best at designing
marketing campaigns for Latino consumers, or that African American teachers
are best at teaching African American students, are examples of these racial
abilities. 43
A third mode of racial abilities is found in low-skilled employment, such as
manufacturing, service jobs, agriculture, and the like. Here, employers will
similarly perceive aptitude to vary with racial backgrounds, but in these jobs,
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 373-74 (1992).
37. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 34.
38. Id. at io.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at ii.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The employers who use this strategy focus on race because they believe that race is an
indicator of the abilities that they seek. They may or may not believe, or care, that those
abilities derive from experiences that persons of any race may have.
3011
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
they perceive variations in qualities they prize, such as abilities to work long,
hard, and without complaint while doing dirty, boring, and/or dangerous
manual work.4 At times, these employers will view the abilities as inhering in
immigrant status as well as racial or national origin backgrounds.4 1 We might
call this "immigrant realism," as the foreign-born status is perceived as real and
relevant to employment decisions.
The other main variant of racial realism, contrasting with racial abilities, is
racial signaling. Employers using this strategy do not believe that workers vary
in their ability to perform tasks, but racial differences can nevertheless become
qualifications for a job because employers believe that certain populations will
respond more positively to some races than others."6 The benefits to the
organization come from leveraging racial difference or sameness to produce
desired reactions in clients, citizens, or residents of communities.
It is important to stress that, by definition, employers use racial realist
strategies to benefit their organizations, not the members of minority groups,
and any benefits to equal opportunity that may occur would be purely
incidental to their organizational goals. However, different racial realist
strategies vary in their congruence with the goals of the Civil Rights
Revolution. For instance, when hiring to leverage a diversity of racial abilities,
employers are not seeking to break down stereotypes, which was one of the
goals of diversity in university admissions approved in the Grutter v. Bollinger
decision.4 7 Rather, they may be said to be hiring on the basis of the racial
stereotype that different races think differently. 8 Still, this racial realism
strategy is less pernicious than the others because it does not lock any racial
groups into particular jobs. The form of racial realism that links the race of
employees to the race of clients or citizens they may serve may be more in
conflict with the goals of the Civil Rights Revolution, because it links groups to
specific jobs, possibly limiting opportunities to these specific jobs and thereby
stunting careers.4 9 Racial signaling has a different conflict with the goals of the
44. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 218.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 13.
47. 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
48. For an insightful discussion of the linkage of racial identities to expectations that people act
according to specific racial "scripts," see K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 98-99 (1998).
49. SHARON M. COLLINS, BLACK CORPORATE EXECUTIVES: THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF A
BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 77-78 (1997).
3012
123:3 002 2014
HAVE WE MOVED BEYOND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION?
Civil Rights Revolution: because racial signaling can be accomplished in some
cases with only token hiring, an employer can signal a commitment to diversity
even though an organization's overall workforce is in fact not diverse.so Finally,
because racial realism in low-skilled jobs puts groups into hierarchies (typically
with Latinos and Asians ranked above whites and blacks)" and can lead to total
exclusion, it is the most pernicious and furthest from the goals of the Civil
Rights Revolution, and may come closest to the kinds of racialized humiliation
that Ackerman discusses."
Is racial realism really totally different from affirmative-action liberalism?
The matter is confused in public discourse and in law, mainly because what
many call "affirmative action" in the context of university admissions is
analytically distinct from what the Supreme Court considers to be affirmative
action in employment, and is subject to different legal rules." Justice Powell's
decision in Bakke argued that race was a permissible consideration in university
admissions because diversity could improve the educational mission of the
university.s4 Powell thus replaced the justice and equal opportunity goals of
traditional affirmative action with a new organizational effectiveness goal.
Universities, journalists, and jurists continue to refer to this practice as
"affirmative action."5 I believe this is unfortunate, as it obscures the fact that
the purpose of the approach has changed.6 Moreover, the Supreme Court's
So. See Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. RFv. 1017, 1053 (2011).
51. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 222-27.
52. One might argue that any of the modes of using racial abilities are less pernicious than racial
signaling, because the abilities prized by employers can (at least in theory) be taught to
anyone through training. On the importance of keeping jobs open to persons of all racial
backgrounds, see id. at 270-72.
53. See supra notes 30-31.
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
ss. The more recent Grutter v. Bollinger opinion makes no distinction between the University of
Michigan Law School's racial preferences for diversity goals and affirmative action. For
example, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion states, "From today's
vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span,
progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to
sunset affirmative action." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
s6. For a discussion, see RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND THE LAW 196-97 (2013). See also Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and
the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 939, 940 (1997) (arguing that "the diversity
rationale is most persuasive when it is augmented by the view that past and present race-
based economic inequality is the reason we cannot achieve meaningful levels of integration
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rules for permissible affirmative action in employment require that it have a
remedial intent -repairing an imbalance in the workforce -and that it must be
temporary." A racial realist intent is not remedial, and it is not temporary.
In practice, it is possible to have affirmative action programs while using
the term "diversity" when the programs seek equal opportunity goals and
better utilization of the available human resources to repair workforce
imbalances.'" If they have explicit goals focused on forward-looking rationales
of organizational effectiveness, they are analytically distinct from affirmative
action, and they may face legal trouble. As Stephen Rich explains, "Unless
those [diversity] initiatives are bona fide affirmative action plans - that is,
court-ordered remedial plans or those plans that satisfy the requirements of
Weber-Johnson -such initiatives have an ambiguous legal status.""
This is because Title VII appears to specifically prohibit the use of race for
organizational goals. The law makes allowances for discrimination on the basis
of all of the traits listed in the law except for race in what came to be known as
the bona fide occupational qualification exception, or BFOQ 6o Specifically, the
statute states that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees . . . on the basis of [their] religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
* 61
enterprise.
without using affirmative action").
57. See supra notes 30-31.
58. This appears to be the case with President Barack Obama's 2011 Executive Order 13,583. The
purpose of the order was to "Establish[] a Coordinated Government-wide Initiative to
Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce." Exec. Order No. 13,583, 76 Fed.
Reg. 52,847 (Aug. 18, 2011). The order's statement of policy uses racial realist discourse (for
example, "our greatest accomplishments are achieved when diverse perspectives are brought
to bear to overcome our greatest challenges"), but the substance of the order is affirmative-
action liberalism and emphasizes goals of justice and equal opportunity: "The Government-
wide Plan shall highlight comprehensive strategies for agencies to identify and remove
barriers to equal employment opportunity that may exist in the Federal Government's
recruitment, hiring, promotion, retention, professional development, and training policies
and practices." Id.
s. Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 8o GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 74(2011).
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There was little discussion in Congress regarding whether or not race should
be allowed as a BFOQ. When Southern members of the House of
Representatives sought an amendment to allow a race BFOQ supporters of the
law resisted. Emanuel Celler (D-NY) offered only this as an explanation: "We
did not include the word 'race' because we felt that race or color would not be a
bona fide qualification, as would be 'national origin.' That was left out. It
should be left out. 6 2 While that provides little in the way of a rationale, it
appears that the representatives of The People did not want race treated as
something real that employers could manipulate for their own purposes.63
The EEOC's Compliance Manual is therefore notably circumspect when it
discusses racial realism. It explains that "[d]iversity and affirmative action are
related concepts, but the terms have different origins and legal connotations,"
because diversity is a "business management concept" and its
antidiscrimination effects are incidental to organizational goals.6 * The EEOC
explains that "[m]any employers . . . implement diversity initiatives for
competitive reasons rather than in response to discrimination, although such
initiatives may also help to avoid discrimination." 6s In the very next sentence,
the EEOC emphasizes only that the equal opportunity and justice intents of
affirmative-action liberalism are acceptable: "Title VII permits diversity efforts
designed to open up opportunities to everyone., 6 6 The Compliance Manual
then goes on to give examples of acceptable actions, none of which use race for
"competitive reasons.' It closes with language that would likely give pause to
employers seeking to use racial realism, explaining that "employers are
cautioned that very careful implementation of affirmative action and diversity
62. 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler). Representative Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. (D-NY) also said, "20 million Negroes are willing to take their chances on this
bill." Id. (statement of Rep. Powell). Senator Clark (D-PA) explained in response to Senate
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-IL), who had asked about the Harlem Globetrotters or
filmmakers doing a movie about Africa, that filmmakers could not demand a black person
but only someone who looked black. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark).
63. Even if there was a BFOQ defense available for racial discrimination, it is not likely it would
inoculate racial realism from legal challenge because courts have greatly limited BFOQ
defenses in contexts where the statute allows it. See SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 16-17.





THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
programs is recommended to avoid the potential for running afoul of the
law." 6 8
The EEOC is wise to urge caution. Indeed, its own compliance manual
appears to rule out the use of race for competitive reasons, including the entire
racial signaling strategy, because by definition racial signaling is catering to
customer preferences. The EEOC explains, "Title VII also does not permit
racially motivated decisions driven by business concerns-for example,
concerns about the effect on employee relations, or the negative reaction of
clients or customers."6 9
Not surprisingly, where private employers have been challenged in court
for racial realist goals, courts have ruled the racial realist strategies to be
impermissible.7 o For example, a firm called The Parker Group made money as
a contractor for election campaigns, and used workers to call potential voters to
urge them to vote for particular candidates." The firm segregated white and
black workers, and used black employees to call black voters when clients
believed that this racial realist strategy would be more effective at winning
votes.72 An African American woman was let go following a campaign in
Alabama, and she sued under Section 1981 for both the termination and the
68. Id.
69. Id. 5 1s-V(A) (footnotes omitted).
70. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 8o-88, 245-64. There have been some cases where employers
have had their diversity policies challenged, but the courts were not confronted with a claim
that the diversity would boost organizational effectiveness. In these cases, diversity simply
meant more representative use of minorities, and thus these were affirmative action rather
than racial realism cases. See, e.g., Reed v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 176, 185 (D.
Del. 2001); Blanke v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 5 89 , 598 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); Harel
v. Rutgers, 5 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 (D.N.J. 1998). Another case involved an employer memo
that made a racial realist claim regarding organizational benefits of diversity, but the issue in
the case was whether or not that memo could be evidence of discrimination against a
particular white male individual, with the court concluding that the memo was not enough
to constitute a prima facie case, but that it could be relevant to a disparate treatment claim.
See ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F. 3d 151, 155, 164 (3d Cir. 1999). For further discussion, see
Rich, supra note 59, at 78 n.388. In other cases, the employer withdrew any defenses based
on diversity goals as the case proceeded through the courts. See, e.g., Rudin v. Lincoln Land
Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2005). The City of New Haven in Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557 (2009), also abandoned a diversity rationale as a defense for throwing out the
results of an ability test when it did not produce an adequate number of nonwhite passing
scores. See Rich, supra note 59, at 78 n-386.
71. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 472, 473 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
72. Id.
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racial realist segregation.73 The Parker Group won on the termination claim,
but its racial realism lost at both the district and circuit court levels.' The
district court argued that the firm used "stereotyped assumptions" to manage
the worker's placement, and this was an "obvious violation of the law" because
"'practicability' . . . is not a defense to racial discrimination. "7 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit framed the legal question as whether an
employer "who acts with no racial animus but makes job assignments on the
basis of race can be held liable for intentional discrimination under § 1981."76
The court of appeals noted that there is no BFOQ for race,77 and there was no
affirmative action strategy in place because the firm was not trying to repair a
racial imbalance.18 It therefore ruled against The Parker Group because the
firm's employment practices were based on racial stereotypes, and with no
legal defenses available, were clearly in violation of the law.7 9
Another area where racial realism is prominent is in the executive
appointment of government officials and judges. This is not prohibited, but
neither is it explicitly authorized as with affirmative action. Since 1972, Title
VII has covered government employment, but it does not reach positions that
are filled through elections or through executive appointment:
[T]he term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public
office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified
voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such
officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office.so
For presidents, the appointment process is governed by the Constitution,
though this only means that a president's appointment powers are limited by
the consent of the Senate, and the point of that limitation was to avoid
73. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F. 3d 468, 471-72 (11th Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 472, 477.
7s. Ferrill, 967 F. Supp. at 475.
76. Ferrill, 168 F. 3d at 473.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 474.
79. Id. at 475.
So. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(f) (206).
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corruption.8' Nothing is said either prohibiting or authorizing the use of race
in making appointments.
Some courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as authorizing
racial realism in employment, 8  but this has only occurred in very limited
contexts, and the Supreme Court has never ruled that racial realism in
employment is constitutional. It has, however, explicitly prohibited one use of
racial signaling in the educational context. The Jackson County, Michigan
Board of Education had used hiring preferences for African American
teachers -a practice that a Michigan district court found permissible based on a
belief that their skin color signaled something positive to students, and thus
African American teachers served as valuable role models for African American
students.83 The Court overruled the lower courts, and disallowed this use of
racial realism because "the role model theory employed by the District Court
has no logical stopping point" and "allows the Board to engage in
discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any
legitimate remedial purpose."48  The Court saw this as not only
unconstitutional, but the opposite of the intentions of the Civil Rights
Revolution: "Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are
better off with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected
in Brown v. Board ofEducation."
Racial realism found widespread lower court approval only in the limited
context of law enforcement. Courts have approved both claims of racial
abilities (minority police officers are able to work more effectively in minority
neighborhoods than white officers) and racial signaling (minority residents
perceive minority police officers as having more legitimacy than white
officers). 6 In doing so, these courts have seen a compelling interest in using
81. Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments
Process, 21 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 475 (1998).
82. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 135-42. Notably, regarding racial preferences for the purpose of
affirmative action, the opposite holds true, and courts may find greater "leeway" under Title
VII than under the Constitution. Sophia Z. Lee, A Revolution at War with ItselJ Preserving
Employment Preferences from Weber to Ricci, 123 YALE L.J. 2964,2969 (2014).
83. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
84. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986).
8. Id. at 276.
86. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F-3 d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996); Talbert v. City of Richmond,
648 F.2d 925, 931 (4 th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 695-
96 (6th Cit. 1979); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5 th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport
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race as part of the law enforcement organizations' "operational needs." For
example, after New York City placed a large number of black officers in a
predominately black neighborhood following a highly publicized and shocking
incident of police brutality there (the beating and torture of Abner Louima), a
New York district court upheld the racial realist strategy of officer assignment:
In order to carry out its mission effectively, a police force must appear
to be unbiased, must be respected by the community it serves and must
be able to communicate with the public. Thus, a police department's
"operational needs" can be a compelling state interest which might
justify race-based decision making.
Another case took the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,8 which
found a compelling interest in the University of Michigan Law School's use of
race to achieve diverse student enrollment, as a precedent for Chicago's use of
race in hiring and placing police officers. The Seventh Circuit stated:
All in all, we find that, as did the University of Michigan, the Chicago
Police Department had a compelling interest in diversity. Specifically,
the [Chicago Police Department] had a compelling interest in a diverse
population at the rank of sergeant in order to set the proper tone in the
department and to earn the trust of the community, which in turn
increases police effectiveness in protecting the city.8 9
It is important to emphasize racial realism in policing is not distinguished from
other contexts on the basis of overwhelming social science evidence in support
of the strategy. One authoritative review of the literature on the impact of
police officer race and policing found that the evidence is mixed and
inconclusive."o
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1973).
87. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v, City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
88. 539 U.S. 3o6 (2003).
89. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, is5 (7 th Cir. 2003).
go. David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics ofLaw Enforcement, 96 J. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1229 (20o6).
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Ill. THE PEOPLE AND RACIAL REALISM, PART 1: GOVERNMENTS
AND THE PROMOTION OF RACIAL REALISM
By the measure of statutes passed by elected representatives, The People do
not support racial realism the way they supported the Civil Rights Revolution.
As discussed above, neither are there broad decisions by the Supreme Court
authorizing racial realism in the employment context.
Yet there are other ways that we might say that racial realism has the
support of the American people and is an act of popular sovereignty. Though
there are no statutes authorizing its use, racial realism is a key strategy that
elected officials sometimes use for filling jobs in government.91 This derives in
part from a combination of the willingness of political actors (including voters)
to consider racial abilities and/or signaling," and the especially painful
histories of particular governmental institutions, specifically schools" and
police departments.94
First, The People themselves appear to use racial realism when voting for
elected officials, or at the very least, they respond positively to elected officials
of their own race. This is suggested by the fact that the geographical areas most
likely to be represented by nonwhites are those areas where nonwhites have
formed majorities.9 s Whites tend to elect whites, and nonwhites elect
nonwhites." Hawaii, the only state with an Asian American plurality in the
electorate, is also the only the state that regularly sends nonwhites (specifically
Asian Americans) to the Senate.9 7 Moreover, a large number of social science
studies have shown that Americans prefer elected officials to be of the same
race as themselves, and respond in positive ways to same-race officials.98
Presidents have anticipated or responded to Americans' racial realist
proclivities, and have made appointments based on a strategy of racial
gi. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 90.
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id. at 121-29.
94. Id. at 112-16.
95. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 23 (1999).
96. Id.
97. PEI-TE LIEN, THE MAKING OF ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 90-93
(2001).
98. For a review of relevant literature, see Vincent L. Hutchings & Nicholas A. Valentino, The
Centrality ofRace in American Politics, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Scl. 383 (2004).
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signaling. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt did the most to establish this
pattern, though it was not until black civil rights leaders pressured him to
create a position to oversee the treatment of blacks in his administration."
After Roosevelt appointed a white southerner to that position, Roy Wilkins of
the NAACP told Roosevelt that African Americans "bitterly resent having a
white man designated by the government to advise them of their welfare."oo
Roosevelt then appointed Robert C. Weaver, an economist with a PhD from
Harvard, to serve with the white southerner.'
President Lyndon Johnson would appoint the first African American to a
cabinet position-also Robert C. Weaver-not following a classical-liberalism
strategy (where Weaver's race was irrelevant), or following an affirmative-
action-liberalism strategy (where Weaver's race was relevant only because
Johnson was remedying past discrimination or imbalances), but a racial realist
strategy, where Johnson sought organizational objectives by displaying
Weaver's race. 0 2 The opportunity came when Congress created the new
Department of Housing and Urban Development, which required the
appointment of a secretary. Black civil rights groups and the black press
demanded that an African American, and specifically Weaver, be appointed,
using various racial realist arguments emphasizing forward-looking
rationales."0 3 Johnson would end up appointing Weaver for his racial signaling
value to African Americans, saying that a white appointment would disappoint
"little Negro boys in Podunk, Mississippi," 0 4 but that a white official was
needed to work with Congress. He explained to his attorney general, Nicholas
Katzenbach, "We've got to get a super man for [the] number two place, and
then send this fellow [Weaver] all around policy touring and let this second
fella do the work with the Congress and with the President and with all the
other people."'0 o Thus, while serving as a major force for the Civil Rights
Revolution, Johnson was also employing a racial realist strategy when making
political appointments.
99. HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEw DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A
NATIONAL ISSUE: THE DEPRESSION DECADE 77-78 (1978).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 95-96.
103. WENDELL E. PRITCHETT, ROBERT CLIFTON WEAVER AND THE AMERICAN CITY: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF AN URBAN REFORMER 273-74 (2008).
104. Id. at 268.
105. Id. at 274.
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Democratic presidents still use racial realism when making appointments,
from Bill Clinton's efforts to have a cabinet that "looks like America""o to
Barack Obama's strategic appointment of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme
Court."0 7 Yet Republican presidents use racial realism as well, though they use
it somewhat differently. If Democrats-who in 2012 received majorities of
African American, Latino, and Asian American votes"os-have typically used
racial realism to keep their supporters happy, Republicans have used it to
signal to all Americans that they are not racists. 0'" While Republican Party
leaders may oppose affirmative-action liberalism, their actions indicate support
for racial realism, and a long line of nonwhite conservatives have enjoyed rapid
elevation to prominence in the party, including Clarence Thomas, J.C. Watts,
Michael Steele, Bobby Jindal, Susana Martinez, and Marco Rubio."o
Republicans have sometimes been quite explicit about this strategy: consider
an op-ed by Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX) in the Washington Post,
where he argued that Republicans could win Latino votes while opposing
legalization or amnesty of undocumented immigrants if they maintained their
social conservatism and ran Latino candidates in elections."'
A. Racial Realism in the Schools
Another government use of racial realism is in the employment of teachers.
Though receiving little support in federal courts, there is a long tradition of
support for the racial matching of teachers and students due to beliefs in racial
abilities, racial signaling, or both."2
106. Claire Jean Kim, Managing the Racial Breach: Clinton, Black-White Polarization, and the Race
Initiative, 117 POL. Sci. Q_55, 68 (2002).
107. Peter Baker & Adam Nagourney, Sotomayor Pick a Product ofLessons from Past Battles, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo/o5/28/us/politics/28select.html.
io8. See Changing Face ofAmerica Helps Assure Obama Victory, PEW RES. CTR. FOR PEOPLE & PRESS
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/u /07/changing-face-of-america-helps
-assure-obama-victory; How Groups Voted, ROPER CTR., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu
/elections/how-groups voted/voted 12.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
iog. TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE
NORM OF EQUAuTY 7, 15 (2001).
11o. For a discussion of this strategy, see SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 96-105.
iii. Lamar Smith, The GOP's Other Election Day Victory, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2010, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2o10/i/19/AR2oio190 5 213.html.
112. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 121-29.
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In 1935, decades before the Civil Rights Revolution, social scientist W.E.B.
DuBois argued for racial realist strategies for staffing schools, maintaining that
white teachers lacked the ability to adequately teach black students."' But even
at the height of that revolution for classical liberalism in the 1950s and 1960s,
prominent advocates in Detroit, Milwaukee, and New York City were arguing
for the placement of black and Latino teachers so they could use their racial
abilities to teach black and Latino students."' A director of personnel in New
York City agreed that
because of the kind of society we have had, unfortunately, it may be
that a Negro teacher, generally, may have a greater likelihood of
developing rapport, and if this is an important characteristic, then we
ought to try to tap it to the extent possible in getting this characteristic
into our schools."'
From the 198os and 199os-around the time that the Supreme Court was
denying the validity of the role model theory for hiring and placing
teachers"' - through the 2010S, various individuals and groups argued for
racial realist strategies in employing teachers, emphasizing abilities or signaling
or both. These included the Carnegie Corporation of New York's Carnegie
Forum on Education and the Economy,"7 the dean of the Harvard Graduate
School of Education,"' the National Education Association," 9 the National
113. W.E.B. DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 91, 91-100 (Waldo E. Martin, Jr. ed., 1998); W.E.B.
DuBois, The Students of Lincoln, in THE EMERGING THOUGHT OF W.E.B. DUBois: ESSAYS
AND EDITORIALS FROM THE CRISIS WITH AN INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARIES AND A
PERSONAL MEMOIR BY HENRY LEE MOON 138-40 (Henry Lee Moon ed., 1972).
114. See CHRISTINA COLLINS, "ETHNICALLY QUALIFIED": RACE, MERIT, AND THE SELECTION OF
URBAN TEACHERS, 1920-1980, at 109-11 (2011).
115. Id. at 235-36.
116. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
117. TASK FORCE ON TEACHING AS A PROFESSION, CARNEGIE FORUM ON EDUCATION AND THE
ECONOMY, A NATION PREPARED: TEACHERS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79-84 (1986).
ns. Patricia Albjerg Graham, Black Teachers: A Drastically Scarce Resource, 68 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
598, 599 (1987).
11g. Livingston Alexander & John W. Miller, The Recruitment, Incentive, and Retention Programs
for Minority Preservice Teachers, in TEACHER RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION WITH A SPECIAL
FOCUS ON MINORITY TEACHERS 45 (Antoine M. Garibaldi ed., 1989); Jody Daughtry,
Recruiting and Retaining Minority Teachers: What Teacher Educators Can Do, in TEACHER
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON MINORITY TEACHERS, supra, at 25.
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Commission on Teaching and America's Future,"o the Education Commission
of the States,"' and Teach for America."'
State governments also supported racial realism in the employment of
teachers. California passed a law stating that nonwhite teachers had abilities
and signaling that benefited both nonwhites and whites, stating:
It is educationally sound for the minority student attending a racially
impacted school to have available to him or her the positive image
provided by minority classified and certificated employees. It is likewise
educationally sound for the child from the majority group to have
positive experiences with minority people, that can be provided, in part,
by having minority classified and certificated employees at schools
where the enrollment is largely made up of majority group students."
The Texas Education Agency issued a report in 1994 that argued for increased
nonwhite presence in the teacher corps due to nonwhite teachers' importance
as role models, their abilities to "interact more successfully with students who
have culturally similar backgrounds to their own," and their abilities to increase
the skills of white teachers to teach nonwhite students.'" At the federal level,
Bill Clinton's Secretary of Education, Richard W. Riley, used racial realist
arguments to justify increased diversity among the nation's teachers:
We need teachers who can relate to the lives of diverse students, and
who can connect those students to larger worlds and greater
possibilities . . . . Children need role models-they need to see
themselves in the faces of their teachers . ... [T]eachers of color help
fight the tyranny of low expectations - the pernicious voices that
whisper into young ears, "You can't do it. Don't even try."'
120. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TEACHING AND AMERICA'S FUTURE, WHAT MATTERS MOST:
TEACHING FORAMERICA'S FUTURE 8 (1996).
121. Arthur Dorman, Recruiting and Retaining Minority Teachers: A National Perspective, POLICY
BRIEFS, no. 8, 1990, at 5; Barbara J. Holmes, Guest Commentary: New Strategies Are Needed to
Produce Minority Teachers, POLICY BRIEFS, supra, at 8.
122. The Importance of Diversity, TEACH FOR AM., http://www.teachforamerica.org/why-teach
-for-america/who-we-look-for/the-importance-of-diversity (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
123. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 441oo(a)(2) (2004).
124. Nancy Stevens, Texas Teacher Diversity and Recruitment, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY 2-4 (1994),
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/acctres/SpecPRR_4-1994.pdf.
125. Richard W. Riley, Our Teachers Should Be Excellent, and They Should Look Like America, 31
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B. Racial Realism in Law Enforcement
The other major area of government support for racial realism is, as
described above, law enforcement, especially policing. As with teaching, the
strategy of racial realism in policing had advocates as early as the 1930s, as can
be seen in the 1931 report of the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, which argued that ethnically diverse police officers would be
beneficial in policing. 126
But the most forceful and consistent advocacy of racial realism in this
context began in the late 196os, after the nation's cities began combusting in
racial violence.'17 In response, New York City began to recruit black and Latino
officers with the belief that their presence would mitigate the rioting and
rebellions."'
In the late 196os and early 1970s, a series of government commissions
issued reports urging racial realist strategies in the hiring and employment of
police officers, based on racial abilities or signaling or both. These include the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice in 1967,"29 the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also
known as the Kerner Commission) in 1968,30 and the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973.' A special
counsel who studied the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department after rioting
there in 1992 made similar arguments,'132 as did a 2001 report of the U.S. Justice
Department. 113
EDUC. & URB. Soc'Y 18, 19-20 (1998).
126. THOMAS A. JOHNSON ET AL., THE POLICE AND SOCIETY: AN ENVIRONMENT FOR
COLLABORATION AND CONFRONTATION 107 (1981).
127. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 113.
128. Id.
129. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON L. ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN.
JusT. 101-02, 107 (Feb. 1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/nij/42.pdf.
130. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 165-66 (1968).
131. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 329-30
(1973).
132. James G. Kolts et al., The Los Angeles County Sherif's Department, L.A. CNTY. 197-216 (July
1992), http://www.parc.info/client-files/Special%/20Reports/3%/20-%20KoIts%/20Report
%20-%2oLASD.pdf.
133. Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples ofPromising Police Practices and Policies, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. 18 (Jan. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/ojp /186189.pdf.
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This kind of advocacy has not only come from appointees of elected
officials, but also from some groups representing people of color. For example,
while fighting for classical liberalism and affirmative-action liberalism, some
local civil rights groups have supported integration of police departments with
racial realist intents. 3 4
Though it is not clear how often hiring occurs with racial realist
motivations, it is clear that the hiring of nonwhite officers rose dramatically
following the 1960s' racial violence and the strong advocacy of racial realist
hiring and placement. Specifically, in the years between 1967 and 2000,
minority employment increased in several police forces, including those in
New York City (from 5% to 35%); Chicago (20% to 40%); Philadelphia (20%
to 40%); Detroit (5% to 65%); and San Francisco (5% to 40%).
IV. THE PEOPLE AND RACIAL REALISM, PART II: THE PRIVATE
SECTOR AND THE RACIAL REALIST STRATEGY
In the private sector, it might be said that The People acted on their own:
racial realism appears to be just as entrenched as in government employment.
It is a prominent strategy and is often advocated in several fields, including
medicine, business (especially marketing), and entertainment. It may be a part
of any business that has some interaction with diverse populations, and where
employers may perceive that racial abilities help them understand customers or
use racial signaling to make customers feel a sense of trust."'
Medicine is an especially compelling sector for racial realism because the
stakes are so high. Here, there was some vague statutory acknowledgement of
134. NICHOLAS ALEX, BLACK IN BLUE: A STUDY OF THE NEGRO POLICEMAN 28-29 (1969); LEONARD
MooRE, BLACK RAGE IN NEW ORLEANS (2010).
135. Sklansky, supra note go, at 1214.
136. See the discussion of how minorities can provide "access and legitimacy" to businesses
dealing with diverse populations in David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Diferences
Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, 74 HART. Bus. REV. 79, 83 (1996). For a
sense of how widespread employer use of racial realism may be, consider the findings of
sociologists Eric Grodsky and Devah Pager, who observed that African Americans may earn
opportunities but lower pay than whites in occupations when their clients are also black.
Black clients are, on average, poorer than nonblack clients, and this depresses income when
employers place blacks with same-race clients based on their perceived racial abilities or
signaling. Grodsky and Pager find that there are fewer racial disparities in earnings when
customer relations are not a measure of productivity, as in the case of bus drivers. Eric
Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and Occupational
Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. Soc. REv. 542, 561 (2001).
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the value of physicians' varying racial abilities. The Minority Health and
Health Disparities Research and Education Act of 2000 contains provisions to
encourage the training and hiring of nonwhite physicians, and Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) argued for the bill to his colleagues with racial
realist arguments emphasizing white physicians' inability to give the same
treatment to African American patients that they give to white patients.
There has been considerable action on this outside of government as well.
A vice president of a Boston HMO, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, explained
very clearly a racial realist hiring rationale when she told Fortune magazine that
the company had a "diversity imperative" because "[m]any of these [minority]
customers demand health care workers who aren't judgmental -and we have
to make sure we provide them.""' Various foundations, commissions, and
professional organizations have also promoted racial realism in the
employment of physicians and other health workers, including the
Commonwealth Fund, 4 o the Kellogg Foundation's Commission on Diversity
in the Healthcare Workforce (headed by George H.W. Bush's Health and
Human Services Secretary, Louis W. Sullivan),' 1 the American Medical
Student Association,4 the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Institutional
and Policy-Level Strategies for Increasing the Diversity of the U.S. Health Care
Work Force,' the American Hospital Association,'" and the American College
137. Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education Act of 2ooo, Pub. L. No.
1o6-525, 114 Stat. 2495 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 287c-32 (20o6)).
138. 145 CONG. REC. S14,288 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
139. Kenneth Labich & Joyce E. Davis, Making Diversity Pay, FORTUNE, Sept. 9, 1996, http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/199 6/o9/o9/216617/index.htm.
140. JOSEPH R. BETANCOURT ET AL., Cultural Competence in Health Care: Emerging Frameworks
and Practical Approaches, COMMONWEALTH FUND 17 (Oct. 2002), http://www
.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/betancourtculturalcompetence 576.pdf.
141. Missing Persons: Minorities in the Health Professions, SULLIVAN COMM'N ON DIVERSITY
HEALTHCARE WORKFORCE 18-25 (Sept. 2004), http://health-equity.pitt.edu/40/1/Sullivan
FinalReport ooo.pdf.
142. Chris Rauber, Shortage of Minority Doctors Proves Hard to Cure, S.F. Bus. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2004, http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2004/03/22/focus2.html.
143. INST. OF MED., IN THE NATION'S COMPELLING INTEREST: ENSURING DIVERSITY IN THE
HEALTH-CARE WORKFORCE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2004), http://www.nap.edu
/openbook.php?record id=10885.
144. EMILY FRIEDMAN, WHITE COATS AND MANY COLORS: POPULATION DIVERSITY AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE: AN ISSUE BRIEFING PREPARED FOR THE
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION 40-42 (2005), http://www.scha.org/files/documents
/WhiteCoatsManyColors-o.pdf.
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of Physicians. 14 In the Grutter v. Bollinger Supreme Court case regarding racial
preferences in law school admissions, thirty different groups (including the
American Medical Association and associations representing dentists,
pharmacists, and nurses) signed on to an amicus brief that used racial realist
rationales for physician employment.' 6 According to a 20o6 report of the
Department of Health and Human Services,
[G]reater health professions diversity will likely lead to improved
public health by increasing access to care for underserved populations,
and by increasing opportunities for minority patients to see
practitioners with whom they share a common race, ethnicity or
language. Race, ethnicity, and language concordance, which is
associated with better patient-practitioner relationships and
communication, may increase patients' likelihood of receiving and
accepting appropriate medical care. 47
Racial realism is also a prominent strategy in marketing. Nonwhite
marketing professionals have promoted their own racial abilities to reach
racially concordant consumers since the middle years of the twentieth century;
in 1953, African American marketers formed their own association, the
National Association of Market Developers, to promote the use of blacks to
market to blacks."8 Firms dominated by whites have also seen the hiring of
nonwhites to market to nonwhites as smart business strategy.'4 9 This was
becoming common by the 199os, and so it was unremarkable for Fortune
magazine to state in 1996, "a company with a diverse work force will have an
easier time serving markets that themselves are becoming more
145. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, UPDATED 2010, 13-
14 (2010), http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/current-policy-papers/assets/racial-disparities.pdf.
146. Brief of the Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6 (2003) (No. 02-241).
147. Bureau of Health Professions, The Rationale for Diversity in the Health Professions: A Review
of the Evidence, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 3 (2006), http://bhpr.hrsa.gov
/healthworkforce/reports/diversityreviewevidence.pdf.
148. JASON CHAMBERS, MADISON AVENUE AND THE COLOR LINE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 66 (2009).
149. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 63-65.
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multicultural.""so The notion of racial abilities extends beyond marketing
strategy to customer relations in general. 51
In sociologist William Bielby's analysis of a major finance firm, the practice
of matching African American financial advisors with African American clients
was described in a 2005 internal report as something that occurred "always." It
led to frustrations among the clients, who resented the higher turnover among
the African American financial advisors. The report stated:
Advisors and managers criticized always trying to fit an African
American client with an African American advisor, especially when an
advisor leaves the business. Because of the high turnover of African
American advisors, this often results in a client being paired with 2 or 3
advisors just because they are African Americans. Ultimately, this
"shuffling" results in the client becoming frustrated and requesting a
white advisor, because they feel they will provide a more stable
relationship.' 2
Racial realist arguments were made explicit in a legal context in the amicus
brief of the Fortune 5oo companies in the 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger case.155 That
brief argued that firms with many nonwhite employees "are better able to
develop products and services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to
market offerings in ways that appeal to these consumers" and "a racially
diverse group of managers with cross-cultural experience is better able to work
with business partners, employees, and clientele in the United States and
around the world."1 ' 4
Another prominent racial realist strategy in the business sector is to
leverage racial abilities for the innovation and dynamism that "diversity" is
thought to confer to any phase of the business operation.ss As explained by a
personnel executive of the Cummins Engine Company in 1986, "differences
15o. Labich & Davis, supra note 139.
151. Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SC. Q.229, 244 (2001).
152. William T. Bielby, Minority Vulnerability in Privileged Occupations: WIty Do Af-ican American
Financial Advisers Earn Less than Whites in a Large Financial Services Firm?, 639 ANNALs AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 13, 24 (2012).
153. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
154. Brief for 3M et al. as Arnici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at to, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 01-1447).
155. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 71-74.
3029
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
among people of various racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds generate
creativity and innovation as well as energy in our work force.,6
Firms made similar arguments in amicus briefs for the Grutter case. MTV
Networks submitted a brief that stated, "[t]he continual innovation required
for success in the industry depends on heterogeneity in MTV's creative work-
teams."'5 7 The Fortune 500 companies' brief stated, "a diverse group of
individuals educated in a cross-cultural environment has the ability to facilitate
unique and creative approaches to problem-solving arising from the
integration of different perspectives."'s More recently, Fortune ioo
corporations submitted a brief in the Fisher v. University of Texas case making a
more vague but nevertheless racial realist argument, stating that "[f]or amici to
succeed in their businesses, they must be able to hire highly trained employees
of all races, religions, cultures and economic backgrounds.""s
Perhaps nowhere is racial realism more openly practiced than in the
advertising and entertainment sectors. Here, employers seek to cater to
customer tastes by deploying racial signaling, typically seeking to appeal to
different consumers by using models or actors of concordant racial
phenotypes. 6o When I say it is openly practiced, I am referring to the still-
common practice of specifying race in casting calls, or "breakdowns," where
race is frequently specified as a way to achieve organizational goals (optimal
audience reaction) rather than opportunity or justice goals for models and
actors.' 6 ,
It took several decades and much pressure from civil rights groups for
advertisers to begin to cast nonwhites with regularity,162 but by the 1990s it
became commonplace. For example, a study of 813 morning and daytime
156. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TODAY: A LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
93 (19 8 6 ).
157. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of MTV Networks in
Support of Respondents at 6, Grutter, 539 U.S. 3o6 (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516).
158. Brief for 3M et al., supra note 154, at lo.
159. Brief for Fortune-oo and Other Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). This
brief also emphasized a less racial realist argument, stressing at several points that these
firms wanted employees, presumably of any race, who had been educated in a racially
diverse environment.
160. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 158-59.
161. Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 10 (2007).
162. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 158.
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children's television commercials in 1997 found that African Americans
appeared in about 51% of all commercials, Asian Americans appeared in 9%,
and Latinos in about 9%.1" Advertisers appear unwilling to risk making whites
feel unwelcome, however, as this group appeared in 99% of the ads.'
This suggests another feature of racial realism in media and entertainment:
it is in this sector that racial realism for whites is most prominent.' Movie
studios are afraid of casting too many nonwhites in a film, and this leads to the
common practice of a black and a white actor sharing lead roles."' The Los
Angeles Times appeared unaware that it might be discussing a violation of
classical liberalism's ban on catering to customer discrimination when it
reported, "[s]tudios are more comfortable casting actors of color, such as
Jennifer Lopez and Will Smith, despite their popularity, when they include a
white star to ensure 'mainstream' appeal.",167
In the low-skilled sector-in jobs in construction, manufacturing, food
service, and other fields - a racial and often immigrant realist strategy may be
admitted in interviews with social scientists or journalists.16 8 Employers in
these fields state that Latinos and Asians make the best workers, often or
especially when they are foreign-born, because they have abilities that other
groups lack.16 9 Typically, the most prized quality is the ability to work long and
hard despite poor working conditions and low pay. 7 o Though racial realism in
this sector uses the perceived abilities of nonwhites, as in the other sectors, it is
the least defensible because it reproduces the same hierarchies in nearly all jobs
(Asians and Latinos above whites and especially above blacks, and immigrants
above American-born workers), and it might even be said (following
163. Hae-Kyong Bang & Bonnie B. Reece, Minorities in Children's Television Commercials: New,
Improved, and Stereotyped, 37 J. CONSUMERAFF. 42, 55 (2003).
164. Id.
165. Some use of race in casting may be based on artistic considerations related to historical
authenticity, and though Title VII does not appear to authorize racial realism in this context,
it is unlikely to be challenged. I thank Christine Jolls for emphasizing this point to me. On
the complexity of "social geography" and how this may lead to selective enforcement of
discrimination law, see Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25 (2000).
166. SKRENTNY, supra note 17, at 168.
167. Robinson, supra note 161, at 19 n.74 (describing the implication of the Los Angeles Times
article).
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Ackerman) to humiliate not only the excluded, but also the preferred, who are
often exploited, especially when they are migrants. Because of the EEOC's
recent efforts to challenge racial realism in low-skilled employment, there is a
growing list of successful cases and settlements against employers using racial
realist preferences for Asian and Latino immigrants."'
V. IS RACIAL REALISM THE PEOPLE'S AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION?
Ackerman argues that the Civil Rights Revolution was a movement of the
American people to remake the foundational legal framework of the nation. It
resulted in statutes, administrative regulations, and court rulings that worked
toward the ends of justice, and it achieved justice by eliminating systematic,
race-based humiliation of minority groups, as well as humiliation of persons
marked by sex, national origin, and religious differences.
Is the movement toward racial realism similarly a movement of The
People? And how are we to assess its fit with the Civil Rights Revolution?
First, as stated above, federal, state, and local governments have through
their actions and/or words shown at least some support for racial realism. They
have done so in their use of appointments to executive, judicial, and party
leadership posts, and in the hiring of law enforcement officers and teachers.
Government use of racial realist strategies, especially by elected officials, at
least implies the support of The People.
In other ways, racial realism appears to be a movement of The People.
Specifically, employers are part of The People, as are advocates, activists,
members of professional organizations, and others affiliated with medicine,
business, and media and entertainment, and they have in various ways shown
their support for racial realism.
When the government and private organizations and employers have used
racial realist strategies - or advocated for their usage - objection, criticism, and
controversy is typically limited to specific instances of hiring and placement, at
least since the 198os. Supporters of racial realism in skilled and professional
171. See, e.g., EEOC v. Paramount Staffing, Inc., No. 2:o6-cV-2624 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2010);
EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-311, 2010 WL 3081339 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6,
2010); EEOC v. Little River Golf, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-546 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2009); EEOC v.
E & T Foods, L.L.C., No. 3:o6-cv-318 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2008). For a discussion of racial
realism in the low-skilled sector and legal challenges to it, see SKREfNTNY, supra note 17, at
216-64.
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jobs typically are proud of what they are doing, and appear to expect to be
praised rather than criticized.
Yet there are reasons to question the constitutional equivalence of racial
realism and the Civil Rights Revolution. First, there are no government
spokespersons clearly articulating why the nation should be moving toward
racial realism. Presidents or members of Congress may mention it in passing,
but there are no speeches comparable to those of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Lyndon Johnson, or Hubert Humphrey that show how racial realism fits with
American traditions and why it is the right thing for employers to be doing. It
has happened slowly, in a piecemeal fashion, mostly in the background, until it
has become commonplace while rarely being acknowledged.
Second, and relatedly, racial realism lacks an authorizing statute. Racial
realism has come up in Congress, such as when Senator Kennedy argued for
the Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education Act of
2000, but no senator recognized its distinctiveness from classical liberalism or
affirmative-action liberalism at that time. The wisdom or justice of racial
realism has never really been debated in Congress or any public venue that I
am aware of, nor has its fit with the Civil Rights Revolution.
Moreover, in addition to the lack of an official, acknowledged "green light"
for racial realism, there appear to be red lights ordering it to stop, or warning
lights suggesting this strategy of management is not a good idea. There are
court decisions denying its legality or constitutionality, including at the
Supreme Court level. The EEOC guidelines at best suggest "caution" when
using racial realism' -and at some points appear to deny the legality of racial
realism altogether."'
There is a third way that racial realism is distinct from the Civil Rights
Revolution. If Ackerman is correct that a goal of that revolution was to end
institutionalized humiliation of minority groups, then it is very much a
problem that some nonwhites have resisted some racial realist strategies. While
I have thus far emphasized the humiliation that comes about from the practice
of racial realism in the low-skilled employment sector, the humiliation of
people of color is also apparent in some studies of business and professional
employees. Some complain poignantly of being "dead ended" in jobs that are
intended to leverage racial abilities or signaling but have little direct connection
172. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 25, § 15.
173. Id.
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to profit generation and thus lack promotion possibilities.7 4 Racial realism can
also be used in strategic ways that nevertheless do not lead to hiring of
nonwhites beyond token levels.' Most importantly, some nonwhites have
challenged their racial realist work assignments in court-a dynamic that is
apparently quite rare (or nonexistent) when employers use classical liberal or
affirmative-action liberal strategies to hire and place workers.7
Finally, while private employers are themselves members of The People, it
is difficult to argue that they are acting with the same kind of authorization and
spokesperson status that the leaders of the Civil Rights Revolution had. These
employers and various civil society advocates are unelected, and they are
accountable to shareholders, funders, or to no one. When employers and other
elites are creating their own version of employment law,'77 it at least suggests
that we have moved beyond the Civil Rights Revolution, but it also suggests
that perhaps we should not have made this move. At the very least, the
phenomenon needs to be acknowledged, and brought in line with the justice
and opportunity goals that are still widely embraced.
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